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Published on
July 21, 2016

Thoughts on Two-Spirit People

I recently read: Two-Spirit People: Native American Gender Identity, Sexuality, and Spirituality, eds. Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Wesley Thomas, and Sabine Lang (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1997). What follows are my initial thoughts on this book, which I have written out in preparation for writing an article about the Cree two-spirit artist Kent Monkman (https://www.artsy.net/artist/kent-monkman-1).


This books resulted from two conferences held by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research dedicated to the issue of gender and sexuality in Native American and Indigenous First Nation populations. The editors acknowledge the originally unpublished manuscript of Beatrice Medicine (Standing Rock Lakota), “Changing Native American Sex Roles in an Urban Context” (1979) as a pivotal moment in the scholarship on this issue.

Though the title of the book presents “Two-Spirit People” as the primary matter of inquiry and investigation, the individual contributions never settle on a fixed definition for this key term. While the authorial identities of the contributors—some self-identified two-spirits, some Native anthropologists, and some non-Native anthropologists and ethnographers—ensures that consensus will never truly coalesce, there is a great deal of productivity churning within the dissensual voice emanating from the book as a whole. “Two-spirit” is not a static category, neither is it a label that gives itself over to felicitous translation to and from distinct indigenous languages.
​

The term two-spirit is, instead, delightfully asymmetrical and unstable. It is not, therefore, a conventional term within the realm of identity politics where identity markers seek to stabilize the identity of minority groups and/or oppressed peoples. It acts, instead, like a promise of sorts, one that calls specific male- and female-bodied indigenous peoples from a number of tribes together in order to obtain a kind of balance. Carry H. House (Navajo/Oneida) calls this a balancing of the male and female, female and male aspects of both individuals and the universe (225). Claire R. Ferrer sees the balance as a straddling between two ages serving the purpose of opening and closing what she calls a “chiasm.” For her, Bernard Second, a Mescalero Apache multigendered singer of ceremonies, opens and closes the chiasm in order to help others understand how the mythic present and lived present are truly the same (247). And yet, any homogenous understanding of the healthful effects of such acts  acquires a kind of asymmetry when non-Native people such as myself try to zoom out and understand the two-spirit identity as a Pan-Indian phenomenon.

Sabine Lang writes the following: "Native American gay and lesbian communities all over the United States and Canada are made up of people from various tribes as well as those of mixed descent. Perhaps for that reason, the two-spirit identity seems to be basically pan-Indian; participants at two-spirit gatherings, for example, are united by common symbols and actions, mainly of Plains provenance, regardless of the participants’ specific tribal background" (112). As Medicine adds, however, "The use of 'two-spirit' as a Pan-Indian term is not intended to be translated from English to Native Languages, however. To do so changes the common meaning it has acquired by self-identified two-spirit Native Americans" (147).

Here, again, we run into what I keep referring to as the term’s asymmetrical relation. The identity “two-spirit” joins together a number of individuals from different tribes, thereby enacting a unification and manufacturing a kind of solidarity, and yet by translating the term “two-spirit” back into the distinct tribal languages of these newly unified individuals we end up entering back into a somewhat contentious heterogeneity. Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Wesley Thomas (Navajo), and Sabine Lang’s introduction clarifies this contentiousness by explaining that, "In some cultural contexts, translating it to a Native language could even be dangerous. For example, if 'two-spirit' were translated into one of the Athapaskan languages (such as Navajo or Apache) the word could be understood to mean that such a person possesses both a living and a dead spirit—not a desirable situation [...] If 'two-spirit' were translated into Shoshone, the literal translation would be 'ghost'" (3). In sum, this book presents “Two-Spirit” people as a disjunctively unified group, and it presents the enterprise of understanding two-spirit culture and belief as a deft undertaking requiring recourse to multiple native languages and epistemologies as well as to fraught historiographies drafted through Western modes of seeing and knowing.

Composed as it was in the early 1990s, this book decides first to plough through the historical ground composed by the word “berdache” that features so prominently in colonial narratives of, for example, men dressing as woman in Native groups between the 16th and 19th centuries. If there is one thing upon which all the contributors to this book agree, it is that the word “berdache” carries a harmful legacy of colonization and enforced homogeneity and should no longer be used by anyone to discuss any type of person. Even once that word is put aside, however, the thorniness of language and naming presents another obstacle.

Tucked within the name “two-spirit,” one finds the words Winkte (Lakota), Nádleeh (Navajo), Kwidó (Tewa), Tainna wa’ippe (Shoshone), Dubuds (Paiute), Lhamana (Zuni), Warharmi (Kamia), and Hwame (Mohave). Each of these words, in turn, leads to contested stories that require the employment of still more contested terms if those stories are to be translated into English for the benefit of Western-trained scholars. So as not to go astray, Western scholars need to adjust the philosophical frames that structures the appraisal of two-spirit stories and histories, as Carolyn Epple writes in her article about the Navajo nádleehi: "How then to define nádleehí? Presently, it would appear to be a nearly impossible task. Western epistemologies do not accommodate persons who are both herself and himself as well as everything else. Instead, we must adopt a different way of perceiving the universe, one that is processual, interconnected, and dynamic" (184). This non-Native perspective is balanced by Wesley Thomas’s observations that a fluid and processual understanding of identity hides beneath the colonizing activities of Christian missionaries who sought to “civilize” the Navajo. Beyond the binary male/female genders so crucial to the Christian morality system, researchers like Thomas find five gender categories, three of which rely on ontological nuances unlocked by the nádleeh, which, properly speaking, is more of a social role than a stable identity category. Even the word “gender” isn’t quite right because, as Farrer points out, “The Athapaskan languages, in which the Apachean languages and Navajo fall, are languages where there are no gender-specific pronouns and where gender is not coded in nouns either” (245). To enter the world of two-spirit scholarship requires a loose grip on the supposed certainties of analytical language as well as an open mind capable of rethinking the functionality of terms like “sexuality” and “gender,” which, upon first glance, seem so necessary in thinking about two-spirits.

What I find in these pages is a necessarily fragmented picture of two-spirit history and contemporary life, one that forces a confrontation with the language I use (and want to use) to identify both individuals and individual expressions. Two-Spirit artistic works, then, offer a tremendously complicated matter of study since the works themselves will surely contain as many asymmetrical and ever-shifting relationships as the word “two-spirit.” Preparing to write about the words of Kent Monkman, I will listen especially carefully to this thought on the term two-spirit from Terry Tafoya (Taos/Warm Springs): “[The term is] Not born but created and, once created for a specific purpose, [it gains] a life of its own, surpassing the intentions of its creator, and eventually providing something life-affirming and nurturing” (193). It is a word belonging to what Cindy Patton calls a “dissident vernacular” in which “meanings created by and in communities are upsetting to the dominant culture precisely because speaking in one’s own fashion is a means of resistance, a strengthening of the subculture that has created the new meaning’ (1990:148)” (cit. Tafoya 193-194).

Scholars of theatre and performance studies frequently wander into the neighboring disciplines of cultural anthropology and ethnography in order to locate primary source material about groups who fall outside of the “Western” subject position. As such, it is highly likely that theatre and performance studies scholars interested in two-spirit people will find this book. For those who do, I think it is important to allow for the disagreements of the individual contributions to ring out and the tension between first-person accounts from Native authors, on the one hand, and third-person accounts of academics, on the other hand, to open up productive spaces of philosophical inquiry.
Published on
July 17, 2016

Trump and Ubu Power

[Originally posted at theater-historiography.org]

​Say No to Know Nothingsby WILL DADDARIO on JULY 16TH, 2016
While reading The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears[1] by Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green, I found a footnote to the historic Know Nothing party of the mid-nineteenth century ensconced in a passage about the institutional history of U.S. slavery. The name of the party rang a bell in my memory, but I couldn’t come up with any particulars so I looked into it. After a few minutes of online research, I found myself wondering at the repetition of history, especially Marx’s (oft-cited) famous addendum, “…first as tragedy, then as farce.” Is not Donald Trump the new, more farcical version of John Bell who ran for president on the Know Nothing ticket in 1859, or, perhaps more accurately, the new Henry J. Gardner who became Massachusetts’s Know Nothing governor in 1854? What started off as a historical retracing of one trail of tears soon led to the recognition of another equally troubling road.
Several news outlets have posted articles and op-eds about the similarities between Trump, the current GOP, and the Know Nothings of the 1850s (see notes below and links/footnotes along the way). Such similarities include an overt racist-nationalist platform of exclusion, a party membership of mostly working class white men seeking personal economic improvement, and an honest (if not also ironic) embrace of ignorance (“I Know Nothing!”) as the party’s shibboleth. Indeed, the link between Trump and Gardner emerges from research into these similarities, specifically in the fact that, despite the party’s working class base, the eventual Massachusetts governor was a wool merchant who improved upon his already-considerable wealth thanks to his elite family’s connections. Like Trump, Gardner seemed to have had little in common with his constituents’ economic identities and needs.
My own addition to these publications comes in the form of a connection between Trump, the Know Nothings (past and present, official party members and merely like-minded), and that which Michel Foucault dubbed the “Ubus” of power. In the early lectures of the 1974-1975 academic year now published as Abnormal, Foucault links specific historical political leaders with the protagonist in Alfred Jarry’s Ubu Roi. What allows this link is Foucault’s observation of “the unavoidability, the inevitability of power, which can function in its full rigor and at the extreme point of its rationality even when in the hands of someone who is effectively discredited” (13). Nero and Hitler, for example, populate what Jana Sawicki calls this “tradition of vile and buffoonish sovereigns.”[2] Hesitant to facilitate any overly simplistic connections between Trump and Hitler, thereby allowing dialogue and debate to dissolve into platitudes, I do support adding Trump to Foucault’s category of Ubu Rulers. We are witnessing not only the farcical (and, therefore, post-tragic) return of the Know Nothings today but also an index of the racist-nationalist conditions that allow such Ubus to take center stage in the U.S. theatre of politics.
Sawicki underscores a similar point in her speculation on the whereabouts of Ubu-power’s many residences: “Perhaps it also resides in a lack of critical reflection on the historical conditions in which such forms of authority arose.” Indeed, when Foucault, in his 1978 essay “What is Enlightenment?” ends by calling for a “critical ontology of ourselves,” which amounts to a historiography of the present, he is asking us all to refuse Ubu government:
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.[3]
The only chance we have of out-maneuvering the vile buffoonery of the persona known as “Trump” is to create a series of conditions that excoriates pride in ignorance, the likes of which we see not only in the mass of Trumpeteers but also in the belligerent leftist supporters who instigate violence at Trump rallies. As the perspicacious George Saunders has recently outlined in The New Yorker,[4] the true damage of the current political fracas has become visible not as a divisive and sickeningly facile binary opposition between Right and Left ideologies but, rather, as a perpetuation of willful ignorance that keeps the U.S. electorate from participating in meaningful conversations dedicated to the nuanced weave of our country’s political fabric.
To my mind, the disaster that has given rise to the resurgence of Know-Nothing-ness is the evacuation of (yes, I’ll say it and mean it) critical thinking from the halls of Secondary and Higher Education. Given Foucault’s astute reference to Jarry’s theatricality, and my own predilection for performance theory and theatre historiography, I am confident that theatre education (both theory and practice) can thrive as a system capable of performing a critical ontology of ourselves, particularly through its recourse to the study of theatricality in everyday life and the performativity of language. Conversely, however, I am fearful that the ossification of theatre and performance studies in higher education, not to mention the almost complete absence of a fine-arts based critical vocabulary in primary and secondary education, can aid in the momentum of the Know Nothings. Without a self-reflexive and philosophical appraisal of the politics of representation, theatre can easily devolve into thoroughly commodified spectacle, and from there spectacle can be freed up to celebrate the Ubus of the world.
With the highly theatrical and absurd conventions of both the Democratic and Republican parties coming up, I urge us to attend to the conditions that make specific statements possible, to the representational practices that manufacture instrumental visibility, and to the everyday silences that create moral vacuums.
[Other notes]
From Encyclopedia Britannica online
“When Congress assembled on Dec. 3, 1855, 43 representatives were avowed members of the Know-Nothing party.”[5]
  • “The Kansas-Nebraska Act was passed by the U.S. Congress on May 30, 1854. It allowed people in the territories of Kansas and Nebraska to decide for themselves whether or not to allow slavery within their borders. The Act served to repeal the Missouri Compromise of 1820 which prohibited slavery north of latitude 36°30´.”[6]
“In 1849 the secret Order of the Star-Spangled Banner formed in New York City, and soon after lodges formed in nearly every other major American city. Members, when asked about their nativist organizations, were supposed to reply that they knew nothing, hence the name. As its membership and importance grew in the 1850s, the group slowly shed its clandestine character and took the official name American Party.”
“the American Party fell apart after 1856. Antislavery Know-Nothings joined the Republican Party, while Southern members flocked to the proslavery banner still held aloft by the Democratic Party. By 1859 the American Party’s strength was largely confined to the border states. In 1860 remnants of the Know-Nothings joined old-line Whigs to form the Constitutional Union Party and nominated John Bell of Tennessee for president.”
  • On Bell (from Wikipedia):[7]
    • “Planter,” or plantation owner; “Although a slaveowner, Bell was one of the few southern politicians to oppose the expansion of slavery in the 1850s…”
    • “During his 1860 presidential campaign, he argued that secession was unnecessary since the Constitution protected slavery, an argument which resonated with voters in border states, helping him capture the electoral votes of Tennessee, Kentucky and Virginia.”
    • Speaker of the House (1834–1835)
    • “briefly served as Secretary of War during the administration of William Henry Harrison (1841)”
“Two other groups that took the name American Party appeared in the 1870s and ’80s. One of these, organized in California in 1886, proposed a briefly popular platform calling mainly for the exclusion of Chinese and other Asians from industrial employment.”
From Ashefield Historical Society
“Although the Know-Nothing party or the American Party was a national political organization, it was strongest in Massachusetts. This party was based on nativistic beliefs and its members were native born male Protestants who were opposed to immigrants being able to vote or hold political office.”[8]
“One of the most influential party members was Henry J. Gardner who was elected as the Commonwealth’s Governor in 1854. Most of the party’s members were from the working class and wished for many reforms that would affect their lives. Gardner, however, was a wealthy wool merchant and a member of the so-called Boston Brahmins (a small elite group of families who were extremely wealthy and well-educated).”
  • Trump parallel??!
From Op-Ed in Baltimore Sun from July 13, 2016
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-know-nothing-20160713-7-story.html
“Eric Heavner taught political science at Towson University for 10 years and now works for a Baltimore real estate developer.”
  • …indeed…
“Perhaps Mr. Trump will skip the convention and go it alone. Such a move would appeal to Mr. Trump’s love of sensationalism, and it would it not be unprecedented. Teddy Roosevelt, for example, broke away from the Republican Party to run for president under the Bull Moose Party banner in 1912, and Strom Thurmond bolted from the Democratic Party to run as a Dixiecrat in 1948.”
“Despite the years that separate Mr. Trump and the Know-Nothing Party, they have much in common. […] their message is virtually the same: Immigrants take away jobs from true Americans and threaten the American way of life. There are other similarities. The Know-Nothings’ were anti-Catholic. Mr. Trump is anti-Muslim. The know-Nothings believed only native-born Americans should be allowed to vote and hold public office. Mr. Trump played the native-born American card by questioning President Obama’s birthplace.”
From HuffPo’s “The GOP: The New Know Nothing Part?”
January 18, 2016
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-gop-the-new-know-noth_b_9010454
John W. Traphagan, Professor of Religious Studies and Human Dimensions of Organizations, University of Texas, Austin
Conclusion: “When we look at the GOP of 2016, it seems very much as though we are witnessing a new version of the Know Nothings of the 1850s. One can only hope that this time it is equally short-lived.”
ENDNOTES
[1] http://www.penguin.com/book/the-cherokee-nation-and-the-trail-of-tears-by-theda-perdue-and-michael-d-green/9780143113676
[2] http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23977-abnormal-lectures-at-the-college-de-france-1974-1975/
[3] http://philosophy.eserver.org/foucault/what-is-enlightenment.html
[4] http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/11/george-saunders-goes-to-trump-rallies
[5] https://www.britannica.com/topic/Know-Nothing-party
[6] http://www.historyplace.com/lincoln/kansas.htm
[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Bell_(Tennessee_politician)
[8] http://www.ashfieldhistorical.org/nothing.htm

Published on
June 17, 2016

Nehinuw Pedagogy and Philosophy

In preparation for an article about Kent Monkman's online installation Casualties of Modernity, I am researching—with great care and slowness—Two-Spirit people and related topics. In addition to the relevant literature on Two-Spirit art and literature, I'm branching off into Indigenous pedagogy. Coming at this topic from my Western, White, Heterosexual, Cis-gendered, Male, Able-Bodied, Christian-raised (primarily Jesuit) point of view requires me to re-think even the most basic concepts and words that I use to think about Monkman's art. As such, I have turned to books on Indigenous pedagogy in order to understand how words like "think," "understand," "know," "truth," and how phrases like, "help each other" and "teach each other" operate for Nehinuw (or Cree) people. 

I have recently finished reading Linda M. Goulet and Keith N. Goulet's Teaching Each Other: Nehinuw Concepts & Indigenous Pedagogies (Vancouver; Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2014). I am struck, yet again, at the relevance of these ideas for all teachers, not only those who encounter students from Indigenous populations. This book should be assigned for all who hope to teach and counter the pervasive banking model of school-as-usual, even though the stories included in its pages mainly address primary and secondary school populations. 

Having taken notes on the book, I decided to compile a glossary of relevant terminology and to share that glossary here. While certain passages dealing with the role of "interaction, practice, and action by doing" are exciting and relevant to me—given my work in performance philosophy—I figure that others will benefit from spending time with these words and concepts, too. For example, all of us engaged in critical pedagogy will marvel at the fact that this book on Nehinuw pedagogy must contain discussions of "t
rustworthy belief in one another" (mumiseetotatowin), "standing up for oneself" (neepuhistumasowin), and "standing up for others" (neepuhistumagehin).

Glossary:

Achimohina
: Stories of people, living beings, and entities


Achunoogehina
: Legends


Ahtotumohina:
Stories of events and happenings


Atoskestumasowin
: Working for oneself


Ininiyuk
: Indigenous peoples (205)

     Inineesiw: adjective to describe someone who has a great deal      of initiative and the skills to carry things through

     Ininiw
: Being self-determined as a person and as a people—to        be strong as an individual within a reciprocal relationship with      the collective, including kituskeenuw

Kinaskahtotumowin or kinaskachimowin: Lying stories

Kinistooten:
Do you understand?

     Kinistootuhin: Do you understand me?

Kiskinauma
gehin: Teaching another.
Has a focus on teacher-directed knowledge or teacher-directed action. This word is used when referring to both formal and informal education (65)

Kiskinaumasowin
: Teaching oneself


Kiskinaumatowin
: Teaching each other


Kiskeneetumowin
: Knowledge
The root is “to know,” but “understanding” is emphasized

Kistenimitowin
: Respect


Kituskeenuw
: Our land/world


Mamitoneneetumasowin
: Thinking for oneself


Mumiseetotatowin
: Trustworthy belief in one another, connotes reliance on each other


Neepuhistumasowin
: Standing up for oneself


Neepuhistumagehin
: Standing up for others


Nisitootumowin
: Understanding and meaning
Itootu is ‘do’ or ‘act,’ so the stem -itootum in nisitootumowin (understanding and meaning) relates to a person’s activities or doings and gives a conjoint sense that learning by interactive doing is dynamically interconnected with understanding

Osamachimohina or osamahtotumohina: Stories of exaggeration

Otootemitowin
: Openness to others


Pehegenimisowin
: “number one thinking,” a form of excessive individualism (62)


Pimachihowin
: Life force system
Example of a Cree “action noun,” nouns that refer to “the act of.” Thus, this word could also be translated as “the lifehood act.”

Pimachihisowin
: (most commonly used word when referring to life in Cree) The self-determined action of individuals, groups, and nations in the quest for life, livelihood, and survival (59).

     
(Pim- indicates action.
The middle stem, -ihiso, signifies the self-determined intentionality of an individual or self-group (60))

Pimatsiwin
: Life, or the state of aliveness


Saseepeneetumowin
: “One perseveres,” or one has long-term stamina in their mind, or has the stamina of determined, focused thinking


Tapehin:
Truth
“In Cree, belief and truth come from the same frontal stem, tap-, and are therefore closely related in Nehinuw thought” (88-89).

Tapuhaugeneetumowin
: Belief

     Tapuhaugenimitowin: Believing in one another

Tipenimisowin
: Developing authority over oneself


Wagootowin:
Relatives


Weechihiso
: One helps oneself


Weechihisowin
: Helping oneself/themselves


Weechihisowuk
: They help themselves


Weechihitowin
: Helping or supporting each other. 
Whereas the focus of weechihisowin is on the self or self-group support, in the case of weechihitowin, the focus is on the interactive collaboration and cooperation within the context of a supportive relationship (61).

Weechitowuk: They help each other Mamuhi weechitowuk: They all help each other

Weechiseechigemitowin
: Alliances for collaborative action

Weechiyauguneetowin
: Partnerships


Weetutoskemitowin: Work together with others; shared collaborative work among individuals, self-groups, and people, or simply the idea of working together (61)

Weetumatowin
: the interactive sharing of information among people on a daily basis
A dialogic sharing of information (61)

Published on
June 12, 2016

Wound/Wound (wind/wind)

Wound/Wound
(wind/wind)
 
The one: (n.) from Old English wund, “hurt injury, ulcer,” leads to (v.); “Figurative use, of feelings, etc., from c.1200.” From Ayto’s research: “…may go back to the same IE root that produced Welsh gwanu, ‘stab.’” [“Stab,” incidentally: “noun, wound produced by stabbing…mid 15th-Century”; meaning “a try,” first recorded 1895-American, “stab in the back” 1881, and “verb, late 14th-Century, ‘thrust with a pointed weapon,’ Scottish.”]
 
The other: to wrap around. From Ayto: “originally meant ‘go in a particular direction’” and leads eventually to “wander.” [Note about this below.] Past participle of “wind,” which leads to another bold homonymy:
 
Wind/Wind: Air in a state of blowing and the act of wrapping around. The flautus that condition speech may wrap around us.
 
Poem comes from this:
The wound wound round
like a staircase winding
winding the one aching to ascend.

 
Note on “wander”: Wind—wrapping around—meant “to go in a particular direction,” and yet “wander,” its heir, means to go in no particular direction. Perhaps we all should wander more aimlessly through language in order to figure out the precise direction in which we’d like to wind our words.
 
Sources:
Etymonline: http://etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=wound
John Ayto, Dictionary of Word Origins   
 
 

Published on
June 7, 2016

Dream Journal (part 2)

Installation number two of an old dream journal I found:

No date (2005?)
Hospital.
3 patients had a strange disease that required a purple mixture/compound to be spread on their backs.
It could only be spread with the tongue.
It felt like community service felt.
The compound was bright purple.
I was also preparing to go to St. Joseph's college in Europe somewhere.
Hospital patient was a girl my age.
After the treatment, we placed her evenly upon the body of another patient.

No date (2005?)
A group of people find themselves together for an unknown reason — felt like Clue! — they figure out that something is not right with Time. I was the ringleader.

No date (2005?)
In a grassy courtyard. Spring day. Talking about post-doctoral work with unidentified woman. Very sunny. I could feel the weather, and I was talking about it, too.

No date (2006?)
I had a real-time conversation with my mother about money. Very intense. No fun. Then, completely unrelated, I dreamt of a group of late-20s people who lived by the sea in bland apartments. They all knew each other and it was very much like a movie or a t.v. drama.

No date (2006?)
3 dismembered heads in a cooler. Large apt. The heads came from a grizzly accident. Military-like principal. James McMenamin is V.P. Christian, Val, Blythe.

No date (2006?)
Story about the battle for the compass of time. 2 primitive societies  and 2 animal societies wage war. The evil guys won. Flash forward: The evil has become mythologized within a city. Magic factions will fight once more for freedom.
Published on
May 17, 2016

Dream Journal

Packing and preparing to move, I found an old dream journal. Here are its contents (installment 1):

July 12, 1995
Something about a girl who I met in a hotel. Sat on my bed and I distinctly remember being in my room and then going to my door and opening to see snow falling. I thought it was odd because it was July. Phone rang, it was my mom telling me to go to sleep.

July 25, 1995
I dreamt that I was at school and in PPD [gym]. There was a huge gladiator competition. I won by hurting everyone to a point where they couldn't compete anymore.

July 27, 1995
Anthony and I battled the forces of evil. Little girl possessed by devil needed to be destroyed.

January 2, 2005
Sci-Fi Dream.
I was a warrior, almost like Jedi.
There were two opposing factions.
I trained
I spied
evil troops took over territory

January 4, 2005
Movie script
the dream was the movie itself
3 characters, Latino
2 adolescent boys and 1 girl
German family
Latinos are indentured servants.
Main image: pool of water, from left
bodies flow on, water gets suctioned out the right side,
bodies flush through the right side,
Also felt like theatre

No date [2005?]
Derrida teaching a class
sort of communicates telepathically
Deanna Martin was in class
sat around conference table
nobody really understood anything
no lights on in classroom
but lots of light through windows
Homework assignment I forgot to do

No date [2005?]
Went to China
met Linq in a hybrid train station/airport
Two stories were merged together.
One was Linq, a friend, and myself hanging out catching up,
the other was like a high school dance

No date [2005?]
horse raising
it was time for the races
needed to get a 
large photograph printed 
so I went to a Kinkos-like place. The sales
people were rude idiots
and kept me from leaving by asking stupider and stupider questions
Left eventually to meet up with Christian
and his mom. We were going for Margaritas 
Somehow my bedroom was located... [ink ran out]

No date [2005?]
Some kind of explosion
in a big city forces people onto underground
trains. The trains contain several hundred
evacuees. While underground a disease
rips through world's pop
leaving nobody alive

No date [2005?]
I meet Linq. He is very tired.
His fingers have grown thin.
He has a walkman/recording device
that he wears strapped to his arm;
this makes him happy. We arrive in 
a city that is all deception
People are [undecipherable word] medicine
to sleep.
Unclear what we were doing there.

No date [2005?]
A woman, slightly deranged in that 
Glass Menagerie kind of way
was the mother of two crab
children that out of embarrassment
and concern for them she hid on a beach.
They were crabs,
but big. I was terrified of them and ran away.
There was an office setting.
​I think it's anxiety about teaching.

Published on
November 3, 2015

Wright and the Magic Circle (Part II)

(Scroll down to Part I, or click here to download all my posts on Jay Wright)

Whereas the last post focused on Wright’s overcoming of the dissociative spatial paradigms found in Modernist poetry—a paradigm that bifurcates the performance experience and/or encounter into performers, on the one hand, and observers, on the other hand—this post will deal with the synesthetic events scattered throughout Wright’s poetry. These events require a spatial reading since the unification of different sensing apparatuses amounts to a synthesis of an individual’s being in the (poem) world. Wright, for example, allocates sound to color and sight to skin in order, I would argue, to help us all learn to read what he calls the “coherent grammar” of our surroundings. 
 
When thinking about what to call the gesture of invitation tucked within the synesthetic realm of Wright’s poetry, an invitation that provides an opportunity to read the entire world all at once and, ultimately, to know what love is, I return time and again to the magic circle. Let’s briefly visit the world of Christopher Marlowe and Dr. Faustus where he famously writes:
 
Within this circle is Jehovah’s name
Forward and backward anagrammatized,
Th’abbreviated names of holy saints,
Figures of every adjunct to the heavens,
And characters of signs and evening stars,
By which the spirits are enforced to rise.
Then fear not, Faustus, be resolute
And try the utmost magic can perform. (1.3.8-15)
 
Offering a user-friendly history of the magic circle, Jon Kaneko-James reminds us that the magic circle served two purposes. First, it protected the magician from whatever he or she conjured. The space within the circle offered sanctuary from the demons without. Second, the circle produced a field of energy and functioned as a conductive space, “the magical words and symbols filter[ed] specific kinds of mystical power into the circle to be used by the magician.” In fact, the second attribute of the magic circle leads us to question whether or not the inner space within the circles’ arcs are indeed safe or whether, instead, the energy conducted to the magician from the signs and symbols inscribed around the circle actually empowered the magician to stop whatever force attempted to assail him/her.
 
Without attempting to resolve that dispute here, I would suggest that both are true. The space of the inner circle is an ancient form of critical distance, something that allows the magician to be, simultaneously, near and far to the action transpiring in the scene. At the same time, the space within the circle, buttressed and enhanced by magical symbols gathered around it, transmits powers to the magician. Transposing this formula to Wright and his poetry, I propose that we think of his poetic equations—as he calls them in Music’s Mask and Measure—as the symbols that form the magic circle around Wright and produce the powerful critical distance necessary for conjuring into being a reading of the world’s coherent grammar, a reading that leads to a necessary naming.
 
Look at this excerpt from Equation 2 (which I’ve reproduced here in such a way as to mimic the page layout of the book itself):
 
The red roof tiles                                        The oriole has established
slip into the morning fog.                           an evasive coherence,
There is a red silence                                     infinite, exact,
               all around us.                                with its place, there where
It will take years to learn                             the day seems set to honor
this coherent grammar.                                the bird's expressive deceit

In the stanza on the left, Wright’s equation rewires the sensorium of things surrounding us such that the redness of the present but muted visual tile-field enacts an audible silence, not dissimilar (in my mind) to the sound of the Summer Sun at its zenith. From within the circle of his poetry, Wright enters into the rewired scene and, perhaps because it is foreign and new, declares that it will take years to learn the coherent grammar of what surrounds him. His poetry, in other words, doesn’t reveal everything at all once. His poetry, instead, offers a glimpse and a bodily sense of all that hides behind daily appearances. This “coherent grammar” amounts to the order of the world presented by and present within each individual thing. I find it interesting that an etymological definition of grammar traces the word back to the late 14th-century: “‘Latin grammar, rules of Latin,’ from Old French gramaire ‘grammar; learning,’ especially Latin and philology, also ‘(magic) incantation, spells, mumbo-jumbo.’” It will take years to learn these rules, to attune ourselves to the incantations of things that sound like mumbo-jumbo upon first encounter but soon, once appraised with care, speak clearly of hidden (occult) truths.
 
While it will take Wright years to attune himself to this grammar—not to mention you, me, humans generally—it takes no time for the oriole who, being of this grammar, speaks it fluently. The “oriole has established an evasive coherence.” Either its being-in-the-world requires evasiveness, or its apparent evasiveness actually masks the coherence of the grammar. I’m not sure which it is – maybe both. But I do know that the oriole’s participation in the world’s grammar comes not only from its song, which, note, Wright doesn’t mention here, but also from its correspondence with world’s colors, sounds, and other senses. Wright conjures the bird “there where the day seems set to honor the bird’s expressive deceit,” which to me means there, in front of the setting sun, whose evening coloration mimics the oriole’s orange, that is, the bird’s expressive outwardness that, despite its seeming ostentation, serves to camouflage it and keep it safe. Oriole, setting sun, red roof tiles :: (silent) song bird, thronging light and distant heat, red silence all around us. The continuum of color, sound, and silence, indeed the continuum of music’s mask and measure, indexes Wright’s brief foray into the world normally hidden by inattentive business.
 
He lingers on another bird—to be precise, the Carolina wren—before revealing the aim of this conjuration, this poetical work:
 
Love is ancient
evidence, an instrument
constrained, jealous of its
utility,
in awe of its own death;
every name embraces it.
 
The purpose behind Wright’s poetry is the desire to conjure love. Love: perhaps another way of saying “this coherent grammar.” Every name embraces it, he says. Is poetry not the daring attempt to name that which either cannot be named or that which wishes to remain unnamable? Each name bracketed, deduced, possibly discerned from within life’s belligerent symphony brings love closer to the caller, the poet. The purpose of all this magic is to call love close, and the space produced by the poem is that which provides the means for embracing love. The word-equations summon; the space of the magic circle conducts the orchestra into the embrace.  
Published on
October 20, 2015

Wright and the Magic Circle

My earlier posts on temporality in Jay Wright’s poetry were, in a sense, practice for this particular post, which is all about space. After re-reading those earlier posts, I can say confidently that I still believe all of my (granted, hesitant) claims. I am, however, interested now in something different, something I’m calling “The Magic Circle,” which appears to me in Wright’s poetic language. This “Magic Circle” demarcates a space of conjuration that has two principle effects. First, the circle sidesteps the paradigm of diassociationism that shapes so much of the visual encounter in Modernist and Post-Modernist literature (more on this in a moment). Second, the circle facilitates truly stunning synesthetic events through which the usually divided sensorial apparatuses (eyes/sight, ears/hearing, skin/touch, etc.) merge in order to produce a “reading” of what Wright calls the “coherent grammar” of the world (and more on this, too, further down). The circle created through Wright’s poetry makes me think of sorcery and witchcraft such as that running rampant in Medieval Europe and conspicuously present in the works of, for example, Christopher Marlowe (particularly Faustus). I have for many years studied the episteme of Medieval Europe that Michel Foucault refers to in The Order of Things as the similitude oriented system of knowledge. In Wright’s poetry I sense an attempt to recuperate—if that’s even the right verb—this episteme’s worldview, perhaps because he values the vibrant interconnectedness of world systems at work then/there.
 
In The Theatre of Truth, William Egginton assesses what he sees as the paradigmatic mode of spectatorship shaping the Modern world. He calls this paradigm “disassociationism,” which allows (i.e., makes it possible for) individuals to create a clear, binary distinction between spectator and performer. This mode of viewing arises in tandem with seventeenth-century aesthetic creations—including, primarily, theatre—and quickly ascends to the realm of habit where it remains out of reach of critique or self-reflection. As Egginton sees it, once an individual identifies herself as a spectator she will subtract herself from the scene of the performance and begin to order to aesthetic event in terms of “on stage” and “off stage.” One’s off stage presence does not necessarily entail a passive mode of consumption, though it does frequently acquiesce to the “truth” of the world being constructed on stage. “The point to grasp,” Egginton continues, “is that once entire populations became fluent in assuming and projecting this division in order to function correctly as theatre spectators, that fluency became a generalized spatial structure for conceptualizing the world as a whole” (14). He transitions from these comments into a conversation about Descartes’ creation of “a thinking substance that looks out onto the world of extended substances” (14), and then he dedicates the rest of his pages to a discussion of how baroque aesthetic offerings refute this binary distinction (by privileging, for example and a la Deleuze, a folding of interiority and exteriority instead of the smooth division of “on stage” and “off stage” or interior (subjectivity) / exterior (objectivity)).
 
I could quibble with Egginton on a number of points, but, in general, I think he’s making an important claim; namely, that Modernity orders itself around a highly theatrical mode of viewing that distinguishes between spectators and performers (never to be merged) and requires a notion of subjectivity as a properly internal domain. In this discussion, I’d like to transition quickly (if not artlessly) to the tendency for Modern and even Post-Modern poetry to capitulate all too quickly to this disassociationism. Consider, briefly (if that’s possible) the opening stanza of Eliot’s The Lovesong of J. Alfred Prufrock:
 
Let us go then, you and I,
When the evening is spread out against the sky
Like a patient etherized upon a table;
Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells:
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question ...
Oh, do not ask, “What is it?”
Let us go and make our visit.
[1]
 
With the opening line, Eliot offers an invitation for me, the would-be spectator, to leave my position as passive reader in order to enter the scene of evening “spread out against the sky” and, through the embodied act of visitation, participate in the poem-world as a performer. While Eliot would like to activate me as the reader, his invitation is in fact conditioned by as assumed definition of my pre-poem state as interiorized subject preparing to consume the poetic fare as a spectator would imbibe a stage performance from the darkened auditorium. Eliot activates me but simultaneously relies upon the disassociationism that outfits me for such an invitation, thereby lending it credence and, in a sense, preserving its authority.
 
I could identify a similar capitulation in Wright:
 
Here begins the revelation of a kiosk,
beside the road: the white eggs
nestled there in straw
turn blue in amber light.
Make of that what you will,
               Say, what you desire […] (Absence 1)

 
Is Wright not setting up the traditional scene where I, reader, am welcomed into a scene outside of myself, perhaps the scene prepared by Wright’s poetic body as it prepares its “colonization” of the road that stretches out beyond the roadside kiosk? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as I, the reader, have stumbled into this scene and might very well assume that “I” am the individual to whom Wright beckons with the phrase, “Make of that what you will.” At the same time, no, because, it turns out, “I” am not necessarily welcomed here. If there is an “I” in this poem, it belongs more properly to Wright himself, and it belongs to him only insofar as he is going to demonstrate to himself that the “I” is neither a certain nor stable marker. As such, he, the poet, is going to demonstrate to himself the difficulty of attempting to demonstrate something when the act of demonstration relies on a seemingly stable “I” to pull it off. To hint at this identity crisis, Wright transitions to Spanish by the end of page 1: “Somos ese quimérico museo de formas / inconstantes.”
 
Wright undoes himself in successive moves through Reading Absence. “I sit in error, or so would I stand.” Neither sitting nor standing, but somehow both (and neither); neither indicative nor conditional tense, but somehow both (or neither). Wright slips in and out of himself only to discover that he himself is nothing that great, nothing so great as to merit more attention than a bowl of green chile, the bluest flower of Zapopan, a goshawk’s exhilarated cry (7). He chooses to slip in this way so as to teach himself how “to release the sunlight / and to allow a magnetic dissonance / in a bird voice that enters the ear” (9).  In other words, he’s working hard to reveal the extent to which he is—at most and at least—a constitutive member of world of matter and energy.
 
As he teaches himself, he occasionally slips back into the disassociationism that, by habit, shapes our assessment of ourselves in the world. He identifies this moments in the text with parenthesis. Recall Adorno’s caution against the reliance on the parenthesis, which, he says, serves only to imprison certain material within the flow of narrative. As it to signify the subjective-philosophical prison created by disassociationism, Wright uses parenthesis to stabilize fleeting theatrical scenes that interrupt his poem-lesson from time to time. The first usage appears on page 12: “The lights reveal the epitome of a wash, with yucca elata sitting sternly in place. A small man, wearing a white guayabera and white cotton trousers, swerves in an irresolute light.” Notice how the poetic stanza gives way to prose at this point. The reliance on the typical on stage/off stage visual configuration somehow commandeers the poem.
 
The poem manages to break free of the scene, but a second interruption occurs at page 41, again marked by parenthesis and prose: “Two small boats, each with a solitary figure standing erect within it, progress through a rapidly flowing basin. The figures gradually reveal themselves to be women […]” These women characters eventually speak (lines in the drama): “Do you known that she is pursuing you?” says one woman. “But I am pursuing her” replies the other. An entire scene plays out over two pages and eventually comes to a rest with these lines: “The women stand in the boats, and raise their arms in supplication. Their mouths open and shut; no words come.)” As soon as it ends, Wright returns to Spanish and signals the difficulty of returning to the poem with a backslash: “/mi corazón e un ofrenda y mis lágrimas / son piedras rituals.”
 
From this point, the poem really picks up steam. Wright’s slip manages to teach himself a lot (or so it seems) and my position as reader becomes one marked by uncertainty: should I be watching this? Am I watching anything, or is the poem inviting me to lose myself along with Wright, to suffer a particular loss of self that will reveal my entanglement in the Everything? There comes a moment when I (Will, actually I, as much as I can be I) find myself hoping for another interruption of prose, a moment to catch my breath. One finally comes, but something is different this time. The parenthesis-prison is still there, but this time an altogether different play erupts. Now, three matadores appear, marked as M1, M2, and M3 I the script, thus hinting at the possibility that Wright may have conjured a single matador split in 3.
 
Every House Has a Door is currently investigating what this is all about. If I can assist in the problem solving (or maybe it’s a matter of posing the problem correctly?), then I will do so by offering this thought: the 3 matadores enact a drawing of a magic circle within the poem so as to protect it from the interruption of disassociationism. That is to say, as Doctor Faustus and other magicians like him would draw a circle on the ground from which to call upon the spirits of the world to appear and make manifest their knowledge, so too do the matadores draw their arena around them thereby protecting them from the harm of spectator/performer binaries and allowing for the possibility that some spirits will come in for a closer look.
 
Spiraling motions abound in the matador scene:

M2 spins in a farol
The three figures write the circle “geographically” by naming points on the globe that encircle them: Sevilla, Lima, Madrid, Caracas, Puebla, Salamanca, Barcelona…
The series of passes, which amount to a series of semi-circular movements

 
Spells punctuate the matadores’ movements, italicized to indicate some kind of communication between Wright and the three figures:

I do not hear the clock
at the far end of the room,
nor the bell that brought me
to this seat

 
But now, somehow, the spells in tandem with the matadores’ movements work to re-position Wright within the world of matter or energy:

I am suddenly
a gossamer thread,
lifted from within,
sheared from this moment,
a process given substance
by a trinity
who will not speak to me.

 
Most fascinating to me: Wright provides no parenthesis with which to close this matador ritual. Once the matadores inscribe the magic circle within the poem, the poem itself is sucked into the scene and can forget any attempt to go back to its former state of autonomous poem because, perhaps, the poem realizes that no state ever existed.  
 
[Pause…the next installation will look to Music’s Mask and Measure to pursue the synesthesia made possible through conjuration within the magic circle]
 
 
 
 
 


[1] http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/poem/173476
Published on
May 23, 2015

Wright's "instant": temporality as qualitative viscosity

Back to The Presentable Art of Reading Absence:

On page 4, Wright offers this passage:

This instant
becomes the smallest unit of meaning
in the universe,
                  an aberration 
that clarifies our contingency.

Almost as quickly as this instant comes into focus, however, sounds of the outside—bird calls, miscellaneous sonorities—call his/our attention away until, on page 7, he/we return:

There must be an inelastic
attention to this moment
                or this flagged instant
                    [...]
                that has suddenly appeared

Throughout this poem, Wright slips into and out of the instant (see the last two posts for more on this notion of the "slip"). In this stanza on page 7, he gives the ambi-valent term "flagged instant," which might signify an instant that is marked, as though dyed to mark its travels through the universe, or it might signify the slowing of the instant, a flagging that comes from fatigue. Taken all together—the slipping instant, the marked instant, and the fatigued instant—I'm motivated once more to name the temporality that Wright conjures through his art of reading absence. Time itself appears as qualitative viscosity. Not a quantitative measure of friction, but, rather, an event of slipping away: the instant slips. There is no noun for time. It is verb. Time does. Again, it slips. The instant is the location of the slip's root.

When one meditates or attempts to discipline thought's meandering, the possibility of planting the now presents itself. The instant, marking the place of the now's root system, shows us where to plant, but the act of planting requires a virtuosic performance of undoing the self. To understand this a bit more, I turn back to Wright:

Such is peace,
and such the motive and lie,
and we have not yet arrived.
            One must learn not to pray

[...]

I resume:
             such is peace,
and such is the inexact profession
of a pilgrim proceeding
           toward the point of his own 
                                         erasure. 

To plant the now means to erase oneself. This erasure will always contain traces of the labor, some detritus caught up in the flow of time, not unlike Rauschenberg's 1953 erasure of de Kooning's drawing.


Picture
Published on
May 13, 2015

Wright's slip (Part II)

The Presentable Art of Reading Absence begins with a slip into a meditation and a slip within that same meditation. The slip into the meditation commences the poem and acts as an entrance, one that smoothly but abruptly places the reader into the condition of revelation, specifically a mundane revelation of "secular mourning." The slip within the meditation is a dual movement that sends both reader and poet deeper into the revelation and also out of the pure meditative state. Present within the opening lines of this poem, then, one finds an effortless struggle to be precisely here, here at "the place set aside / for creating the body." Reader and poet alike enact the work of spectator and performer, and, all the while, time materializes as the viscosity that conditions these various slips.

A passage from Polynomials and Pollen offers another point of view onto the understanding of temporality made possible by Wright's poetic work:

Profound
fallacy, time breeds a small
notion to propound
an instrumental pulsing,
the pause
that courts the wish to install
itself as the thread
and perfect measure of trust. (14)

I revel in the geography of this passage. One needs to fashion a map first before traversing the stanza. The fallacy: time breeds a small notion... time, also understood as that pause that courts the wish to install itself... Once we understand what the fallacy is, we can set to interpreting the consistency of that fallacy (its "meaning"). Time compels beings to forward a practical notion, the probability that we are all progressing steadily via the pulse of time's push. Between the pulse's signals, each pause, a stillness between the beats, pretends to the status of the present. The present, in other words, is the pause between the breaths, neither inhale nor exhale but the hiatuses between the two. This claim, however, is false. The time of the present is not a pure rest, nor is time itself. Time itself does not breed anything, and, as such, beings should not feel compelled to subscribe to progressive movements regulated by steady pulses. Working back to the notion of Wright's slip, I wonder if time act rather as the condition of moving from one breath to the next, from one rhythm to another. Time as limit of possibility for rhythm. 
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Will Daddario, PhD, MEd, LCMHC, LCAS

Scholar, Author, and Psychotherapist integrating performance philosophy, critical theory, and clinical counseling. Providing specialized care for trauma, anxiety, and addiction in Indian Trail, Charlotte, and throughout North Carolina via secure telehealth.

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